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This paper analyses the strength of the new laws regulating lobbying in Ireland and the 
United Kingdom (UK).  This examination was conducted using the Centre for Public 
Integrity’s (CPI) ‘Hired Guns’ quantitative method for assessing the stringency of lobbying 
legislation.  These laws were introduced, after years of unfulfilled promises and scandals, in 
an effort to increase the public’s trust in their representative institutions.  We find that the 
Irish Regulation of Lobbying Act 2015 offers a slightly higher level of transparency than the 
UK’s Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration 
Act 2014.  Additionally, using the CPI’s index allows our findings to be compared with those 
from other jurisdictions around the world with lobbying regulations in place. 
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Lobbying is considered an essential component in the creation of public policy by policy 
makers, lobbyists, academics and those in favour of a more open and democratic process 
(Chari et al., 2007: 422).  Professional lobbyists, interest groups, charities, and private firms 
are all capable of providing advice on policy matters that decision makers may not be capable 
of otherwise addressing, thereby helping to develop better policy outcomes.  As Holman and 
Luneburg (2012: 74) argue “lobbying is absolutely essential to the success of representative 
government.”   
Unfortunately, the practice of lobbying and lobbyists attract negative connotations 
thanks, in part, to sensational scandals highlighting deeply embedded relationships between 
lobbyists and policy makers (Leech, 2013).  These scandals capture the public’s attention and 
create distrust between the public and policy makers.  Scandals have helped foster a 
perception that lobbying is influence peddling in which self-serving entities exercise greater 
than normal sway over policy outputs (Holman and Luneburg, 2012; Schubert et al., 2016).  
Because of this negative perception, demand has grown for regulations addressing the 
practice of lobbying and lobbyists.   
The purpose of regulating lobbyists is to create a level of transparency that allows the 
public greater opportunity to hold policy makers to account (Murphy, 2014).  Brinig et al. 
(1993: 377) highlight a public interest view that legislative regulation of lobbying “would 
take more account of the general welfare and less account of private interests”.  Currently 17 
countries regulate their lobbying industries, but many of these only introduced regulations 
after the turn of the century (Chari et al., 2010; Holman and Luneburg, 2012; OECD, 2014, 
Transparency International, 2015a).  In federations, such as the United States (US), Canada 
and Australia, there are lobbying regulations in place at the national, state and provincial 
levels.   
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This paper is the first to compare the strengths of the new lobbying regulations in 
Ireland and the United Kingdom (UK) using the Centre for Public Integrity’s (CPI) index, as 
well as placing the results within the broader context of global lobbying regulations, as set 
out by Chari et al, (2010).  The Regulation of Lobbying Act 2015 was Ireland’s first attempt 
to regulate lobbying, despite the various draft bills put forward from the 1990s onward.  In 
the UK, efforts at regulating lobbying had for many years focused on self-regulation by 
public affairs bodies employing codes of conduct.  However, these efforts left a lot to be 
desired (Nolan Committee, 1995).  Eventually, the UK introduced the Transparency of 
Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014. 
This paper initially discusses the literature on lobbying regulation and transparency.  
Following this, we set out the methodology, trace the development of the lobbying laws in 
Ireland and the UK, and then examine those laws using the CPI’s index, comparing their 
strengths and weaknesses.  The conclusion highlights the findings, and the significance and 
limitations of the paper. 
  
Lobbying and its regulation 
Defining what exactly is meant by the word “lobbying” has proven problematic (Chari et al., 
2010: 3; Greenwood and Thomas, 1998; Nownes, 2006: 5; McGrath, 2009a: 107; Scott, 
2015).  This has rendered definitions of lobbying for legislative purposes under-inclusive, 
inappropriate, or vague.  Thus, “legislative attempts to regulate [lobbying] have foundered on 
definitional terms” (Greenwood and Thomas, 1998: 489).  Examples include the European 
Union (EU) legislation proposed by MEP Marc Galle which foundered on the difficulty of 
defining both “lobbying” and “lobbyists”.  Other examples include the US Federal 
Regulation of Lobbying Act (1946) which failed to encompass all forms of lobbying 
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(Greenwood and Thomas, 1998; Holman, 2009).  By the 1990s this had resulted in many 
lobbyists in Washington, DC, operating under the radar (Wolpe and Levine, 1996). 
 Thus, a clear definition of lobbying would help (OECD, 2009).  For instance, Fouloy 
(2005) defined lobbying as “influencing political decisions via lobbyists on behalf of another 
person or special interest group”.  However, Hogan et al., (2011: 3) recognised that many 
definitions, such as this one, tend to be too vague for legislative purposes. A more detailed 
definition might be “lobbying is an activity of individuals or groups, each with varying and 
specific interests, attempting to influence decisions taken at a political level” (Chari et al., 
2010: 4).  However, this may be perceived as interfering with citizens’ rights to meet with 
their representatives.  In general, with more detailed definitions, it has been difficult to form 
exclusionary definitions to both properly legislate whilst at the same time protecting the 
individual’s freedom to petition (Greenwood and Thomas, 1998).  With the US Lobbying 
Disclosure Act of 1995 an effort was made to provide a more objective definition of a 
lobbyist than set out in the earlier 1946 legislation referred to above:  
 
The term "lobbyist" means any individual who is employed or retained by a 
client for financial or other compensation for services that include more than 
one lobbying contact, other than an individual whose lobbying activities 
constitute less than 20 percent of the time engaged in the services provided by 
such individual to that client over a six month period.  (Government of the US, 
1995) 
 
Up to that point, lobbyists active in Washington, DC had been free to subjectively determine 
their principle purpose and most did not select lobbying (Wolpe and Levine, 1996).  Overall, 
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the legal definition of lobbying is core to any lobbying legislation and “delineates who is 
required to register and disclose information” (Opheim, 1991: 407).  
Greenwood and Thomas (1998: 493) define regulation as “the control, direction or 
adjustment of a private or quasi private activity for the purpose of some public benefit”.  
Moran (2003) sees regulation as an act of steering, hinting that if regulation is introduced it 
will be directed in a way to give a set and defined result.  “In contrast to many other forms of 
business, the lobbying industry remains largely unregulated with the majority of jurisdictions 
trusting the industry to self-regulate” (Hogan et al., 2011: 36).  Such non-legislative rules act 
as guidelines, however there are no legal repercussions should actors fail to abide (Asimow, 
1985).  Chari et al., (2010: 4) see lobbying regulation as the “idea that political systems have 
established ‘rules’ which lobby groups must follow when trying to influence government or 
public policy outputs”.  These regulations should be codified formal rules passed by 
parliaments, and enforceable by law.  Should a lobbyist fail to comply with the rules, there 
should be an appropriate punishment.  A lobbyist register should also be available to all 
citizens.  The OECD (2009: 4) argues that the overall objective of lobbying regulation is the 
“imposition of some degree of transparency” as well as a level of ethical standards and 
behaviours which “lobbyists are expected to comply with”.   
It is imperative that lobbying regulations do not prevent citizens from approaching 
their representatives (OECD, 2009).  But, whether a person is representing a charity, or a 
business, if they interact and communicate with a government, or public official, they are 
engaged, however ad hoc, in lobbying (McGrath, 2009a, p. 107).  However, in some 
jurisdictions, for example under the US Lobbying Disclosure Act 1995, if individuals 
engaging in lobbying activities do not meet the financial, or time, thresholds for mandatory 




Rationale for lobbying regulations 
Proponents of lobbying regulations argue that they result in transparency in decision making, 
increased accountability of public officials and better decisions through discussion and 
reflection (Fahey, 2016).  “Transparency is the ease with which the public can monitor the 
government with respect to its commitments” (Broz, 2002: 861).  If something is more 
transparent, the public will be able to see how decisions are made.  In a democracy, for an 
effective administration, elected officials should be accountable for their decisions 
(Moncrieffe, 1998).  Deliberative democratic theory argues that for quality and legitimacy 
within the policy decision making process, it should be the “product of an exchange of 
reasonable arguments between equal individuals” (Crespy, 2014: 3).  Significantly, Chari et 
al., (2010: 129) note “there is no evidence to suggest that any lobbying legislation has 
inhibited ordinary citizens from going to see their representatives about ordinary issues.” 
 
Rationale against lobbying regulations 
Regulations in the form of “increased registration requirements would be especially onerous 
for small groups and organisations” (Ainsworth, 1993: 53).  In Denmark and Germany, for 
instance, public officials see the involvement of interest groups, associations or non-
professional lobbyists such as “workers, farmers and industry as a legitimate part of the 
political system” (Rechtman and Larsen-Ledet, 1998: 583).  In Scotland, Dinan (2006) found 
that some lobbyists (but certainly not all – see Chari et al., (2010)) opposed regulations on the 
grounds that increased transparency infringes on a firm’s ability to operate effectively in 
privacy.  Similarly, Stasavage (2004), looking at international organisations, argues that a 
fishbowl policy could impede effective problem solving due to officials being less inclined to 
withdraw from initial positions when confronted with persuasive counter-arguments.  Brandt 
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and Svendsen (2016) point out that there is also the cost to the state of regulating the 
lobbying industry.  However, Chari et al., (2010: 130), when examining lobbying regulations 
in North America and Europe, found that improvements in information technology allowed 
lobbyists to register online at no cost, and permitted governments (both national and sub-
national) to maintain registers at minimal cost.   
 
Methodology  
We wish to assess the strength of the legislation regulating lobbying in Ireland and the UK.  
These jurisdictions were selected due to their recent introduction of lobbying legislation, 
2014 in the case of the UK and 2015 in Ireland, along with their similar parliamentary and 
cabinet structures.  Ireland modelled its cabinet structure upon that in the UK in its 1937 
constitution.  There is also the fact that despite deepening industrial connections with the US 
and monetary and political links with the European Union (EU), Ireland’s relationship with 
the UK is still important in terms of geography, language, labour market and trade flows 
(O’Hagan and Newman, 2014).  Historically, the economies of both countries were closely 
connected.   
There are four methods for the quantitative analysis of legislation regulating lobbying.  
These are, Opheim’s (1991) stringency of US state lobby regulations; Brinig et al’s, (1993) 
ratings for the restrictiveness of US state lobbying laws; the CPI’s (2003) Hired Guns 
Method, which looked at US state and federal lobbying regulations; and Transparency 
International’s (2015a) methodology for comparing lobbying regulations in Europe.1 
The first two approaches have been applied exclusively to American states’ lobbying 
regulations, and are somewhat out of date, having been developed prior to the proliferation of 




internet usage.  The fourth approach has only been applied to European jurisdictions and, as a 
result, is like its earlier American counterparts - narrowly focused geographically.   
However, the CPI’s Hired Guns method has been utilised in analysing and comparing 
lobbying regulations, in terms of transparency and accountability, in the US (Thomas et al., 
2008) and in various national and subnational jurisdictions across the world (Australia, 
Canada, Germany, Israel, Lithuania, Poland, Taiwan, and the European Union etc.), thus 
providing us with a wide range of comparators (Chari et al., 2010; Crepaz and Chari, 2014; 
Sgueo, 2015; Veksler, 2016).  The CPI is a Washington, DC, based nonpartisan, non-profit 
investigative news organisation, with a focus on transparency, amongst other things.    
Although the CPI’s method was designed for examining US lobbying regulations, this did not 
render it inapplicable elsewhere.  This was because the approach is capable of considering the 
different standards in lobbying regulations across the US – making it analytically 
encompassing.  According to Crepaz and Chari (2017) the CPI’s ‘Hired Guns’ method, 
compared to the three other methods, best captures the robustness of the legislation 
examined.     
The ‘Hired Guns’ method is a comprehensive ranking system that assigns a score to 
each jurisdiction with lobbying legislation, based upon a survey of 48 questions regarding the 
details and components of that legislation (Chari, et al., 2010: 100).  “These questions 
address eight key areas of disclosure for lobbyists and the organisations that put them to 
work” (see Appendix) (CPI, 2003).  The maximum possible score is 100. This methodology, 
with 18 of its questions focused on financial disclosures, even encompasses such issues as 
gift giving (questions 14 and 23) and campaign contributions (question 24) by lobbyists.  
Thus, the methodology places significant emphasis on financial disclosures, which are a 
requirement in some US states and at the federal level; at the EU level, in France, Austria, 
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Slovenia, the Philippines, and to some extent at the Canadian federal and provincial levels 
(see Chari et al, 2010; Crepaz, 2016; Crepaz and Chari, 2017).   
 
Table 1: Hired guns method’s 8 areas of disclosure and maximum points 
Areas of disclosure  Maximum CPI score  
Definition of Lobbyist 7 
Individual Registration 19 
Individual Spending Disclosure 29 
Employer Spending Disclosure 5 
Electronic Filing 3 
Public Access (to a registry of lobbyists) 20 
Enforcement 15 
Revolving Door Provisions 2 
Total score possible  100 
Source: https://www.publicintegrity.org/2003/05/15/5914/methodology 
 
The findings can be categorised according to Chari et al.’s (2007) typology of 
lobbying regulatory environments – low, medium or highly regulated.  The CPI paid 
particular attention to “how the state defined what a lobbyist is, what requirements it has for 
registration and spending disclosures, and how it regulates legislators-turned-lobbyists”, it 
further “factored in effective oversight, such as electronic reporting, public access to 
information and enforcement” (Morlino et al., 2014).   
 
The evolution of lobbying regulations in Ireland and the UK 
Ireland  
The issue of lobbying regulation rose to prominence when the Tribunal of Inquiry Into 
Certain Planning Matters and Payments, known as the Mahon Tribunal (1997-2012), (the 
longest and most expensive public inquiry in Irish history, costing between €250m and 
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€300m) alleged the bribery of public representatives by lobbyists (Kennedy, 2012).  The most 
notorious lobbyist was Frank Dunlop, a former journalist and government press secretary, 
who was imprisoned for bribing county councillors on matters to do with land rezoning 
(McGrath, 2009a).  Five county councillors were arrested and charged with receiving corrupt 
payments in 2010 (Murphy et al., 2011).  Senior politicians, such as Ray Burke, a former 
Minster for Justice, were also found to have received corrupt payments from a succession of 
builders and businessmen and made decisions that were deemed not in the public’s interest 
(Murphy, 2014).  Also, over the years, policy decisions on banking were taken in secret after 
lobbying by the banks (Murphy et al., 2011).  The most notorious case was when, on the 
night of 29 September 2008, the government provided a full guarantee for all monies lent by 
Irish banks (O’Rourke and Hogan, 2012).    
In an environment where the public is concerned “about the integrity of government 
decision making, measures to ensure transparency and accountability become essential” 
(Bertók, 2008: 18).  The Labour Party attempted to introduce lobbying legislation on a 
number of occasions after 1999.  These efforts were innovative in seeking to define lobbyists, 
the practice of lobbying, and the targets of lobbyists, in order to minimize loopholes 
(McGrath, 2009b).  The 1999 Bill also sought to include grassroots lobbying.  “This appears 
to have been the first legislative attempt anywhere in the world which would have made the 
process of grassroots lobbying transparent to policymakers and the general public” (McGrath, 
2009b: 259-60).   
After the 2007 general election a register of lobbyists was mentioned in the Green 
Party’s programme for government.  In 2010, the main opposition party, Fine Gael, as part of 
its reform agenda, set out its registration of lobbyists bill.  Murphy et al., (2011) compared 
this bill with the Labour Party’s revised 2008 bill, using the CPI’s Hired Guns Method, and 
found that both would, if enacted, result in Ireland being rated as a low regulation 
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jurisdiction, according to Chari et al’s (2010) criteria.  The Fine Gael bill scored just 17 
points, while the Labour bill scored 29.  Both bills ignored cooling off periods – the interval 
during which former legislators are prohibited from engaging in lobbying activities.   
The 31st Dáil, convened in March 2011, was led by a Fine Gael/Labour coalition with 
the largest majority in the country’s history. A portion of this government’s mandate revolved 
around reforms to the Oireachtas (Parliament) and Dáil (Lower House), one of which was the 
introduction of a lobbying register (McGrath, 2011).  Brendan Howlin, Minister for Public 
Expenditure and Reform, acting as a political entrepreneur (Hogan and Feeney, 2012), led 
this drive.  After “dialogue and engagement between Government and all sectors of society”2, 
the Regulation of Lobbying Bill was published on 20 June 2014, and signed into law by the 
president on 11 March 2015. 
 
United Kingdom 
Lobbying, and its regulation, has been the subject of various parliamentary inquiries in the 
UK over the years. One of the most famous of these inquiries was conducted by the 
Committee on Standards in Public Life in 1995, often referred to as the Nolan enquiry, after 
its then chair Lord Michael Nolan (Zetter, 2014).  The topic rose to prominence due to the 
access and influence legislators allowed lobbyists, such as permitting lobbyists to use 
Westminster function rooms for meetings.  In 1992, the Select Committee on Members 
Interests highlighted that those members who hold consultancy positions with private 
organisations should ensure they do not allow their positions to be used improperly (Leach et 
al., 2007).  Despite this, the response was that unless “something was expressly forbidden, it 
was possibly acceptable” (Jordan, 1998: 528). The Nolan Committee highlighted that without 




outside employment “fulltime legislators would be less well informed and hence more reliant 
on lobbyists” (Jordan, 1998: 529).   
In 1994, lobbying firms established the Association of Professional Political 
Consultants (APPC) in response to the ‘cash for questions' scandal involving prominent 
lobbyist Ian Greer (Pieczka, 2006).  Whilst initially encouraging legislative action, the APPC 
instead opted for a self-regulating scheme.  The APPC required its member firms to adhere to 
a code of conduct, furthermore it made available, via the internet, a list of its member firms 
and a register of their staff and clients, as well as the minutes of its regular meetings 
(McGrath, 2009c; OECD, 2012).  However, these provisions were ultimately found to lack 
enforceability and could not prevent further scandals.  
In 2009, the House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee published a 
report “calling for a statutory register of lobbying activity to bring greater transparency to the 
dealings between Whitehall decision makers and outside interests” (Gay et al., 2012: 1). The 
British government rejected this recommendation, instead favouring more time for the 
lobbying industry to self-regulate. But, controversies continued, and the government 
eventually decided to pursue the Transparency of Lobbying, Non-party Campaigning and 
Trade Union Administration Act 2014.   
However, according to Cave and Rowell (2015: 267) “‘a dog’s breakfast’ is how one 
MP described the ideas the Coalition government came up with to shine a light on lobbying.”  
The executive director of Transparency International UK also expressed the opinion that the 
legislation was poor, but he was not sure if this was due to hasty drafting or deliberate 
muddling (Barrington, 2014).  Cave and Rowell (2015) blame the problems with the 
legislation on the campaign waged against it by the commercial lobbyists themselves – 
arguing to politicians that there was no problem to solve.  Zetter (2014), himself a lobbyist, 




Analysis and comparison of the Irish and UK lobbying laws using the CPI’s index  
Here we will examine and compare, using the Hired Guns Method, Ireland’s Regulation of 
Lobbying Act 2015 and the UK’s Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and 
Trade Union Administration Act 2014.  The preamble to the Irish law states that it is: 
 
An Act to provide for establishing and maintaining a register of persons who 
carry on lobbying activities; to provide for a code of conduct relating to 
carrying on lobbying activities; to impose restrictions on involvement in 
lobbying by certain former designated public officials; to amend the Ethics in 
Public Office Act 1995; and to provide for related matters. (Government of 
Ireland, 2015) 
 
Thus, the legislation is seeking to achieve a number of objectives simultaneously.  The 
preamble to the UK’s lobbying law states it is “an Act to make provision for establishing 
and maintaining a register of persons carrying on the business of consultant lobbying and to 
require those persons to be entered in the register” (Government of the UK, 2014).  At first 
glance, this suggests that the UK law is more modest in its aims that the Irish legislation.      
The texts of both Acts are readily available online at: www.irishstatutebook.ie and 
www.legislation.gov.uk.  Furthermore, both laws resulted in the creation of registers of 
lobbyists that provide extra information, and supplementary notes, to aid in understanding 
the laws. These registers can be found at the websites: www.lobbying.ie  and 
www.Registrarofconsultantlobbyists.org.uk.   
The core concept addressed here is measuring the rigour of the legislation and some 
elements of its implementation.  The method employed, the CPI’s index, involves allocating a 
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score to the legislative provisions.  These scores will allow ranking and comparison on a 
global scale, permitting us to categorise the legislation according to Chari et al., (2010) 
typology of strong, medium or weak jurisdictions.  This will allow us to assess the overall 
comprehensiveness of each Act.  Finally, we discuss the similarities and differences of the 
laws. 
 
Definition of Lobbyist  
The Irish Act in section 5, subsections 1-4, seeks to regulate lobbying, which it assumes can 
be performed by anyone, and does not define a lobbyist (Government of Ireland, 2015).  The 
definition of lobbying takes into account paid lobbying, and volunteers.  Furthermore, it 
recognises in-house and professional lobbying, as well as representational groups such as 
trade unions. 
 Despite the absence of a definition of a lobbyist, the definition of lobbying is so 
comprehensive, by addressing executive and legislative lobbyists, by detailing designated 
public officials (DPO) - government ministers and ministers of state, and members of the 
parliament - that would be the targets of lobbyists, that the Irish Act receives a CPI score of 7 
(see Appendix).  Furthermore, under section 5, subsection 8 of the Act, the minister for 
Public Expenditure and Reform can designate prescribed office holders, which may include 
high ranking civil service roles.  “The Minister may prescribe descriptions of public servants 
under subsection (1)(f) by reference to their roles, levels of remuneration, grades or similar 
factors” (Government of Ireland, 2015).  A list of these office holders is published on 
departmental websites.   
 The British Act seeks to regulate ‘consultant lobbying’ and ‘consultant lobbyists’.  
Part 1, section 2, subsection 1 of the Act states “a person carries on the business of consultant 
lobbying if—(a) in the course of a business and in return for payment, the person makes 
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communications within subsection (3) on behalf of another person or persons” (Government 
of the UK, 2014).  This subsection, along with section 2, subsection 3 suggests that the 
definition of consultant lobbyist only applies to those who act as full-time lobbyists and seek 
to communicate with minsters, or departmental permanent secretaries, for third parties (Hine 
and Peele, 2016).  The lobbying of ordinary members of the House of Commons, or House of 
Lords, and local councillors, remains unregulated.  This definition excludes in-house 
lobbyists, as lobbying may not be a core part of a business’s activities, particularly for many 
large firms (Baggott, 2015).  We have assigned a CPI score of 4 points to this part of the 
legislation (see Appendix).  Interestingly, the definition of lobbying in the House of 
Commons’ Code of Conduct encompasses a wider array of public office holders than the 
lobbying law.  
 
Individual Registration 
In terms of individual registration, the Irish Act scores 10 from the maximum 19 points 
available (see Appendix).  Strengths of the legislation include the need for individuals and 
groups to register if they engage in relevant communication with a DPO.  While legislation 
elsewhere, as in the US, has held that a person, or group, would only have to register if they 
lobbied for more than a set amount of time, the Irish Act has no such requirement and anyone 
who engages in lobbying has to register.  Section 8, subsection 1 of the Act states “a person 
shall not carry on lobbying activities unless the person is a registered person” (Government of 
Ireland, 2015).  A lobbyist can delay registering for up to 21 days after the relevant four 
month period.  Furthermore, it is not required to update registration information until that 
relevant date of a given period.  In section 12, subsection 5, the legislation also requires 
lobbyists to identify, by name, each of their employers.   
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 The UK Act requires individual registration, however if the person is an employee of 
a lobbying firm, they themselves do not have to register.  Part 1, section 1, subsection 1 states 
“A person must not carry on the business of consultant lobbying unless the person is entered 
in the register of consultant lobbyists” (Government of the UK, 2014).  However, schedule 1, 
part 1, section 1, subsection 4 provides that “an individual does not carry on the business of 
consultant lobbying by reason of making communications as an employee in the course of a 
business carried on by the individual’s employer” (Government of the UK, 2014).   
Furthermore, if an individual owns a lobbying firm they can register as a company 
and not as an individual.  While registration is required quarterly, this must take place prior to 
lobbying, which is somewhat different from Ireland.  But, there is no requirement for the 
subject matter, or bill number, to be included upon registration.  Registration details have to 
be updated within two weeks after the end of a given quarter.  As with the Irish Act, a 
registrant is not required to submit photos.  In this section, we have assigned a score of 11 
points to the British legislation (see Appendix). 
 
Individual and Employer spending disclosure 
As with a lot of medium regulatory environments, as defined by Chari et al. (2010), both 
Acts place no requirements on lobbyists, or their employers, to disclose expenditures in 
compensation, gifts, entertainment, nor the level of ‘financial effort’ dedicated to a given 
lobbying activity (see Appendix).  Consequently, the legislation in both jurisdictions scores 
no points under these headings – meaning all 18 questions relating to financial disclosures are 
unaddressed.  This is a clear deficiency in the legislation in comparison to that found in the 
US, where financial disclosures are often considered important and has resulted in most US 
state legislation achieving higher CPI scores than found elsewhere in the world.  
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As Murphy et al. (2011: 117) point out, “registering lobbyists is not about regulating 
speech, but about preventing undue influence, including abuse of dominant financial position 
of some interest groups.”  “The interest of [businessmen] is always in some respects different 
from, and even opposite to, that of the public ... The proposal of any new law or regulation of 
commerce which comes from this order ... comes from an order of men ... who have generally 
an interest to deceive and even oppress the public” (Smith, 1776: 200).   Consequently, 
without financial disclosures being a requirement of the Irish or British laws – a failure in 
terms of ensuring that the system is as transparent as possible – this aspect of lobbying will 
continue to pass under the radar in both countries.   
 
Electronic filing 
In Ireland, the oversight agency, the Register of Lobbying, part of the Standards in Public 
Office Commission (SIPO), provides lobbyists with a way of registering online at 
https://www.lobbying.ie/umbraco/Surface/AccountSurface/Register that is straightforward, 
and free.  This is supported by guided online walkthroughs via YouTube.com which provides 
details on how to register and file reports.3  The Irish Act gains 2 points in this section of the 
CPI scoring template (see Appendix).   
 In the UK, the website, 
www.registerofconsultantlobbyists.force.com/CLR_Login_Page was set up for electronic 
registration, which scores 2 points (see Appendix).  Interestingly, as far as the user 
experience goes, it is somewhat limited, especially in comparison to the voluntary websites 
that have been set up by the Chartered Institute of Public Relations (CIPR) and the online 
registration website found at lobbying-register.uk.  These publish slightly more information 




(including lists of staff names) than the official legislative register and have over 5 times 
more lobbyists’ registrations than the official register.    
 As of January 2017 there are 1,540 registrants on the Irish site www.lobbying.ie; 
while there are only 145 on the British site www.registrarofconsultantlobbyists.org.uk/.  This 
is despite the fact that the British legislation predated the Irish by over a year, and the 
population of Britain is almost 14 times that of Ireland.  Of course, this difference has nothing 
to do with public access to the data, which is almost the same in both jurisdictions, but has 
everything to do with how lobbying and lobbyists are defined by the legislation.   
 
Public Access 
The Irish legislation in section 10, subsection 3, states that “the Register shall be made 
available for inspection free of charge on a website maintained or used by the Commission 
[SIPO]” (Government of Ireland, 2015).  As a result, the Register of Lobbying has developed 
an effective website.  Registrations, and filed reports, are provided online at Lobbying.ie via a 
searchable database, and all of the data can also be downloaded as an Excel file.  Sample 
registrations are provided online to guide lobbyists and any information held in relation to the 
register, or filings, can be retrieved free of charge.  However, there is no information 
provided on lobbyists’ spending, as none is sought by the legislation.  The register is updated 
almost immediately.  In this section we assign 10 points to the Irish Act (see Appendix). 
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 While details in Part 1, section 7, subsection 1 of the UK legislation as to what is 
required on registration forms are sparse (Government of the UK); the register is still 
available via a searchable database that can be downloaded in the form of an Excel 
spreadsheet.  There is no cost for checking registrations or the returns made per quarter.  
Furthermore, assuming all details provided on registration are correct at the initial time, 
registration can take place, or is assumed to take place, within four days unless prior 
communication is made by the Office of the Registrar.  As in Ireland, points are lost due the 
lack of any spending reports, or reporting on total spending, or related items, by the Office of 
the Registrar.  We have assigned 9 points to the UK legislation under this heading (see 
Appendix).   
   
Enforcement 
In some ways it is unfair to pass judgement on the Irish Act due to its commencement on 1 
September 2015.  Some enforcement powers have not yet been put in place, due to a review 
of the legislation commencing in September 2016.  The Irish Act earns 6 out of 15 points on 
enforcement, scoring for the statutory power SIPO has been granted to conduct audits and 
compel lobbyists to comply with review requests (see Appendix).  Section 19, subsection 1 of 
that Act states “if the Commission reasonably believes that a person may have committed or 
may be committing a relevant contravention, the Commission may authorise the carrying out 
of an investigation under this section” (Government of Ireland, 2015).  Furthermore, there is 
a statutory penalty of €200 ($212) for incomplete filing of reports by lobbyists.  Under 
section 18 of the Act this penalty can be increased to a class C fine, which can reach a 
maximum of €2,500 ($2,645), or up to 2 years in prison on summary conviction for failing to 
register, providing false information, or obstructing an investigation.   
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The UK Act does moderately well, scoring 7 points.  The legislation gives the 
Registrar the power to perform audits and reviews under part 1 sections 8 and 9, stating “The 
Registrar must monitor compliance with the obligations imposed by or under this Part” 
(Government of the UK, 2014).  Furthermore, the authority has conducted reviews, with its 
first fine of £2,000 ($2,440) issued on 19 December 2015.  This penalty also resulted in the 
name of the delinquent filer being published.  The fine appears to have been levied against 
this lobbyist firm largely due to their being confused as to the requirements of the 
legislation.4  Under part 1, section 16, subsection 3 of the legislation, the statutory civil 
penalty for failing to register as a consultant lobbyist, or failing to file a return, can reach a 
maximum fine of £7,500 ($9,150).   
 
Revolving Door Provisions 
The Irish Act, part 5, section 22, subsections 1a and 1b state “a person who has been a 
relevant designated public official shall not—carry on lobbying activities in circumstances to 
which this section applies, or be employed by, or provide services to, a person carrying on 
lobbying activities in such circumstances” for one year (Government of Ireland, 2015).  
These stipulations give the legislation the maximum 2 points (see Appendix).   
 However, SIPO may give consent to circumvent this provision.  What is of interest for 
proponents of more stringent lobbying rules is how many such requests will be granted to 
circumvent the provision.  That said, this revolving door provision goes further than much of 
the US legislation, in that it prohibits the former DPO from not only lobbying themselves, but 
also from working for, and being employed by, a lobbyist during the initial 12 months from 
when they leave public service.  This constitutes a fairly comprehensive cooling off period.  





In the US, the former public office holder is only prohibited from actively lobbying, while 
effectively permitted to consult, and strategize, and work for a lobbying firm.   
 In the UK Act there are no provisions dealing with the ‘revolving door’ issue, thereby 
allowing former representatives and public officials to freely join lobbying organisations after 
their government service has ended.  The result is that the UK’s legislation receives no points 
under this aspect of the CPI scoring system.  However, on leaving a ministerial position, 
former ministers are prohibited from lobbying government for a period of two years under the 
UK’s Ministerial Code from October 2015 (Cabinet Office, 2015).  This is a long cooling off 
period.  Additionally, under this code former ministers must clear any employments they 
wish to take up with an independent advisory committee.     
 
Findings  
Both laws, despite all of their defects, constitute important steps in preventing undue 
influence over public policy, and governance.  This is crucial, given the general 
disenchantment with public life and cynicism for politicians in both countries (Feeney et al., 
2015; Norton, 2014: 326).  This cynicism is part of a broader trend in the wealthier European 
economies of distrust in governmental authorities (Holman and Luneburg, 2012).   
In terms of what constitutes lobbying, both laws are similar in their definitions; their 
differences being to whom the legislation applies.  Upon analysis, utilising the CPI’s ‘Hired 
Guns’ method, we assign the Irish Act a score of 37, and the British legislation a score of 33 
(see Appendix).  These CPI scores (see Table 2 for synopses), according to Chari et al. 
(2010), constitute medium regulatory environments, where medium ranges from 30-59 
points.   
 
Table 2: The legislative scores synopsis 
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Areas of disclosure  Maximum CPI 
scores  
Irish Act CPI 
scores 
UK Act CPI 
scores 
Definition of Lobbyist 7 7 4 
Individual Registration 19 10 11 
Individual Spending Disclosure 29 0 0 
Employer Spending Disclosure 5 0 0 
Electronic Filing 3 2 2 
Public Access (to a registry of 
lobbyists) 
20 10 9 
Enforcement 15 6 7 
Revolving Door Provisions 2 2 0 
 100 37 33 
Regulatory Environment  Medium Medium 
Source: https://www.publicintegrity.org/2003/05/15/5914/methodology; and Appendix for 
detailed calculations 
 
The Irish Act represents 5 out of 7 of the ideal components required to be considered 
a medium regulated jurisdiction, as set out by Chari et al. (2010: 106), losing out on both 
aspects of expenditure reporting.  However, the British Act contains only 3 of the 7 
components – lacking spending disclosures, legislative lobbying and a cooling off period 
(See Table 3).  These absences account for most of the 4 points difference between the two 
laws.   
 
Table 3: Characteristics of medium regulated jurisdictions  
Characteristics Irish Act  UK Act 
Legislative and executive 
lobbyists   
√ X 
Disclosure of individual 
spending  
X X 





Online registration  √ √ 
Register accessible to all √ √ 
Mandatory reviews/audits √ √ 
Cooling-off period  √ X 
Source: Chari et al. (2010: 106) 
 
The findings place both laws at the lower end of the list of medium regulated 
jurisdictions (30-59 points).  In fact, the British Act is closer to the top of the lowly regulated 
jurisdictions (1-29 points).  Of the 70 jurisdictions examined by Chari et al. (2010), including 
countries, states, and provinces, a CPI score of 37 would place Ireland between Western 
Australia and New Hampshire, while 33 would place the UK between Australia and Poland 
(see Table 4).   
 
Table 4: Selected jurisdictions’ CPI scores.  
Jurisdiction Score Jurisdiction Score 
Washington 87 Quebec  40 
Kentucky 79 Western Australia  38 
New Jersey 65 Ireland  37 
US Federal 2007  62 New Hampshire 36 
Maine 59 Australia (Fed) 33 
Pennsylvania  50 United Kingdom  33 
Newfoundland 48 Austria 32 
Illinois 45 France 30 
Lithuania 44 Poland 27 




The Irish Act’s CPI score of 37, a piece of legislation enacted by a Fine Gael/Labour 
coalition government, is higher than the Bills presented by Labour in 2008 (scoring 29) and 
Fine Gael in 2010 (scoring 17).  In fact, the legislation shows significant steps towards a 
more transparent lobbying environment, in that it takes into account paid individuals who 
may sometimes engage in lobbying.  It therefore recognises specific moments when people 
engage in behaviour that would be considered lobbying. 
 The UK Act, with its CPI score of 33, appears to focus on only some aspects of 
lobbying – applying to consultant lobbyists, or organisations whose main purpose is 
lobbying.  This excludes in-house lobbyists and consultant lobbyists where lobbying is only a 
minor part of the work they do.  The Act’s bypassing of businesses that conduct mainly non-
lobbying activities is a problem, as there is an absence of information in the legislation as to 
what constitutes ‘mainly’ in terms of time, money, or other factors.  It is this kind of opacity 
that the US government sought to resolve in 1995 with the Lobbying Disclosure Act. 
Where the Irish Act focuses on legislative and executive branch lobbying, which 
includes lobbying directed at ministers, Teachtaí Dála5 (TDs), senior civil servant, special 
advisors and local councillors, the British legislation only applies to communication with the 
executive.  The Irish law also requires more information to be provided on lobbyists’ returns.  
The British Act regulates the activities of only some lobbyists.  Transparency International 
(2015b) said the current UK definition leaves 96 percent of lobbyists unaccounted for.  There 
is also the issue in the UK that lobbyists have to pay a £950 ($1,160) fee to register.  This fee 
was put in place to negate arguments against the costs to the public of regulating lobbyists.   
 Utilising the data in Chari et al., (2010: 103), we determined an average CPI score of 
52.4 for the 72 regulated jurisdictions (national and subnational) that they analysed (see Table 
                                                 
5 Members of the Irish parliament. 
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5).  This shows that the Irish Act is within a standard deviation of the mean, whereas the 
British law is outside of this.   
 












This is the first study to comparatively examine the new lobbying regulations in Ireland and 
the UK.  Our aim was to use the CPI’s Hired Guns index, which has been employed in other 
jurisdictions by the CPI, Chari et al., (2010), Crepaz and Chari (2014), Sgueo (2015) and 
Veksler (2016) to measure the strength of the regulations in both countries.  Taking Chari et 
al’s, (2010) threefold classification of regulatory systems, the CPI scores assigned to the Irish 
and UK legislation makes them both medium regulatory environments.   
The Irish legislation does a more comprehensive job in defining lobbying, and by 
extension, what lobbyists do.  It asks for the subject matter being lobbied on and the results 
being sought, the exact type of lobbying engaged in, and the name of the DPO who was 
lobbied.  This law also provides for a cooling off period.  The British Act does not provide a 
rounded picture of what lobbyists are doing in UK, as it seeks to regulate only a small part of 
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that industry.  As neither law deals with the issue of financial disclosures, this ensures that 
they cannot be considered strong regulations.  While both laws set out provisions for 
investigation, enforcement and penalties to dissuade lobbyists from misbehaving, confusion 
may arise in relation to the British legislation, due to the high number of lobbyists who do not 
have to register and the absence of a cooling off period.  From this we can see that, even 
within systems with similar CPI scores, there can be very different approaches to regulating 
lobbyists.   
Whilst both laws are not comprehensive, they mark a starting point in both countries’ 
attempts to regulate lobbying though the legislative process.  What has to happen now is a 
strengthening of the enforcement of the enacted legislation.  Later, when the laws are 
reviewed, and as future scandals occur – as is inevitable (Morris and Goldsworthy, 2016) – 
they will likely be amended and become gradually stronger.  This was what Chari et al., 
(2010) found when examining succeeding US and Canadian federal lobbying legislation.  
The crucial issue at this stage for Ireland and the UK is to ensure that their new laws create a 
level of transparency that benefits all parties - the lobbyists, legislators and most especially 
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Answer UK Point 
Value of 
Answer 
Definition of Lobbyist    
1 In addition to legislative lobbyists, does the definiton 
recognize executive branch lobbyists? 
Yes  3 No 0 
2 How much does an individual have to make/spend to 
qualify as a lobbyist or to prompt registration as a 
lobbyist, according to the definition? 
0 4 0 4 
Individual Registration    
3 Is a lobbyist required to file a registration form? Yes 3 Yes 3 
4 How many days can lobbying take place before 
registration is required? 
16+ 0 0 4 
5 Is subject matter or bill number to be addressed by a 
lobbyist required on registration forms? 
Bill 3 no 0 
6 How often is registration by a lobbyist required? Annually 2 Quarterly 2 
7 Within how many days must a lobbyist notify the 
oversight agency of changes in registration? 
16+  days 0 11-15 
days 
1 
8 Is a lobbyist required to submit a photograph with 
registration? 
No 0 No 0 
9 Is a lobbyist required to identify by name each of 
employer on the registration form? 
Yes 1 Yes 1 
10 Is a lobbyist required to clearly identify on the 
registration form any additional information about the 
type of their lobbying work (ie, compensated or non-
compensated/contract or salaried)? 
 
Yes 1 No 0 
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Individual Spending Disclosure    
11 Is a lobbyist required to file a spending report? No 0 No 0 
12 How often during each two-year cycle is a lobbyist 
required to report spending? 
N/A 0 N/A 0 
13 Is compensation/salary required to be reported by a 
lobbyist on spending reports? 
N/A 0 N/A 0 
14 Are summaries (totals) of spending classified by category 
types (ie, gifts, entertainment, postage, etc.)? 
N/A 0 N/A 0 
15 What spending must be itemized? N/A 0 N/A 0 
16 Is the lobbyist employer/principal on whose behalf the 
itemized expenditure was made required to be identified? 
N/A 0 N/A 0 
17 Is the recipient of the itemized expenditure required to be 
identified? 
N/A 0 N/A 0 
18 Is the date of the itemized expenditure required to be 
reported? 
N/A 0 N/A 0 
19 Is a description of the itemized expenditure required to be 
reported? 
N/A 0 N/A 0 
20 Is subject matter or bill number to be addressed by a 
lobbyist required on spending reports? 
N/A 0 N/A 0 
21 Is spending on household members of public officials by 
a lobbyist required to be reported? 
N/A 0 N/A 0 
22 Is a lobbyist required to disclose direct business 
associations with public officials, candidates or members 
of their households? 
N/A 0 N/A 0 
23 What is the statutory provision for a lobbyist 
giving/reporting gifts? 
N/A 0 N/A 0 
24 What is the statutory provision for a lobbyist 
giving/reporting campaign contributions? 
N/A 0 N/A 0 
25 Is a lobbyist who has done no spending during a filing 
period required to make a report of no activity? 
N/A 0 N/A 0 
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Employer Spending Disclosure    
26 Is an employer/principal of a lobbyist required to file a 
spending report? 
No 0 No 0 
27 Is compensation/salary required to be reported on 
employer/principal spending reports? 
No 0 No 0 
Electronic Filing    
28 Does the oversight agency provide lobbyists/employers 
with electronic/online registration? 
Yes 1 Yes 1 
29 Does the oversight agency provide lobbyists/employers 
with electronic/online spending reporting? 
N/A 0 N/A 0 
30 Does the oversight agency provide training about how to 
file registrations/spending reports electronically? 
Yes 1 Yes 1 
Public Access    
31 Location/format of registration or active lobbyist 
directory: 
Download 4 Download 4 
32 Location/format of spending reports: N/A 0 N/A 0 
33 Cost of copies: Free 1 Free 1 
34 Are sample registration forms/spending reports available 
the Web? 
Yes 1 No 0 
35 Does the agency provide an overall lobbying spending 
total by year? 
N/A 0 N/A 0 
36 Does the agency provide an overall lobbying spending 
total by spending report deadlines? 
N/A 0 N/A 0 
37 Does the agency provide an overall lobbying spending 
total by industries lobbyists represent? 
N/A 0 N/A 0 
38 How often are lobby lists updated? Daily  4 Daily  4 
Enforcement    
39 Does the agency have statutory auditing authority? Yes 2 Yes 2 
40 Does the agency conduct mandatory reviews or audits? Yes 2 Yes 2 




42 Is there a statutory penalty for late filing of lobby 
spending report? 
N/A 0 N/A 0 
43 When was a penalty for late filing of a lobby spending 
report last levied? 
N/A 0 N/A 0 
44 Is there a statutory penalty for incomplete filing of a 
lobby registration form? 
Yes 1 Yes 1 
45 Is there a statutory penalty for incomplete filing of a 
lobby spending report? 
No 0 No 0 
46 When was a penalty for incomplete filing of a lobby 
spending report last levied? 
N/A 0 N/A 0 
47 Does the state publish a list of delinquent filers either on 
the Web or in a printed document? 
No 0 Yes   11 
Revolving Door Provision    
48 Is there a "cooling off" period required before legislators 
can register as lobbyists? 
Yes 2 No 0 
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